Animal Cruelty/Abuse:Docking & Cropping

Indiana

Elisea v. State of Indiana

777 N.E2d 46

Court of Appeals of Indiana, 2002

FACTS:  Shawn and William Stratton hired Elisea to perform ear croppings on two of their pit bull puppies.  Elisea was not licensed to practice veterinary medicine.  Elisea bound the dogs’ legs and mouths with tape, marked a line along each ear with eye pencil, numbed the ears with ice, and without any anesthetic, cut the dogs’ ears with a pair of office scissors.  ACC officers later found the puppies at the Stratton’s home with “no ears at all” and “covered in blood.”  Elisea was charged with one count each of cruelty to an animal and practicing veterinary medicine without a license.  He was found guilty and sentenced to a 1 year executed jail sentence.  Elisea appealed claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence. 

ISSUES:  Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the finding that Elisea’s actions met the statutory definition of cruelty to an animal; whether the evidence presented was sufficient to overcome Elisea’s defense that he engaged in a reasonable and recognized act of handling puppies; whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Elisea practiced veterinary medicine without a license; and whether the sentence imposed was too harsh.

HOLDINGS:

1) Cropping a puppy’s ears with an office scissors and without anesthetic is not a reasonable and recognized act of handling dogs.  Such actions meet the statutory definition of “knowingly or intentionally torturing, beating, or mutilating a vertebrate animal resulting in serious injury or death to the animal.”

2)  The act of cutting the puppies’ ears was a surgical procedure for which Elisea accepted money and such actions meet the statutory definition of engaging in the practice of veterinary medicine.

3)  A one year executed sentence for the crimes of cruelty to an animal and practicing veterinary medicine without a license is not too harsh.

New York

People v. Nelson

815 N.Y.S.2d 495

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, New York, First Department, 2006

FACTS: Defendant Nelson was convicted of animal cruelty based upon evidence that he tightly wrapped a rubber band around the base of a Rottweiler’s tail for three days in an attempt to dock the tail.  The procedure failed, leaving the dog with an open wound two inches in width.  As a result, the Rottweiler’s tail had to be amputated.  Nelson admits that attempting to dock the dog’s tail in this manner undoubtedly caused pain and suffering to the dog.  However, he appeals his conviction, alleging that the People failed to establish that his behavior was accompanied by mental culpability.

 
ISSUE: Whether the People needed to establish that Nelson’s conduct was motivated by mental culpability.

 
HOLDING: No, the People did not need to establish that Nelson’s conduct was actuated by mental culpability.  Animal cruelty is a strict liability offense not requiring any mental state.

New York

Hammer v. American Kennel Club

304 A.D.2d 74

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York, 2003

FACTS: Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a Brittany Spaniel with a natural, undocked tail approximately ten inches long.  The American Kennel Club (AKC) standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel in competitions includes a provision stating that any dog with a tail longer than four inches will be penalized.  Hammer believes that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and therefore alleges that the effect of the AKC’s tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from competition unless he complies with what he believes to be an unfair and discriminatory practice.  In an amended complaint, Hammer seeks declaratory judgment that the tail standard unlawfully discriminates against him by excluding his dog from competition, is arbitrary and capricious, violates Agriculture and Markets Law, and is null and void as in derogation of the law.  The AKC moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Hammer did not have the legal capacity to sue and that he failed to state a cause of action.  The lower court granted the motion.  Hammer appeals.

         
ISSUE: Whether Hammer lacks standing to sue.

HOLDING: Yes, Hammer does lack standing to sue.  The Legislature included a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions, thereby precluding the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well.

New York

People v. Rogers

703 N.Y.S.2d 891

City Court, City of Watertown, New York, 2000

FACTS: Defendant Ralph Rogers docked his young puppy’s tail himself, using a rubber band.  Rogers’ neighbor then purchased the puppy, but soon after became concerned about the condition of the tail.  She took the puppy to the local animal shelter where the puppy was kept under observation.  She then took the puppy to the veterinarian, who determined that the puppy’s condition at the time required that the puppy be euthanized.  Rogers was charged with violating the anticruelty statute, and moved to dismiss.

   
ISSUE: Whether the use of the words “unjustifiable” and “unjustifiably” in the anticruelty statute violate the Due Process Clause because they fail to give a reasonable person adequate notice that the conduct of docking a dog’s tail under the facts of this case is prohibited by the statute.

 
HOLDING: Yes, the use of the words “unjustifiable” and “unjustifiably” in the anticruelty statute are in violation of the Due Process Clause because they are so vague as to fail to give a reasonable person adequate notice of when docking a dog’s tail becomes a crime.  Rogers’ motion to dismiss is granted.    

Texas

Bell v. State

761 S.W.2d 847

Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont, 1988

FACTS: Appellant John Wayne Bell was convicted of cruelty to animals for intentionally and knowingly torturing a dog by amputating his ears.  The dog was a Rhodesian Ridgeback cross-bred puppy belonging to Bell.  Bell was found guilty by a jury of the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals, and was sentenced to six months in jail and a $500 fine.  The jail term was probated for the period of one year.  Bell appeals, presenting one point of error.

ISSUE: Whether the information was fatally defective because the complaint was not sworn to by a person authorized to do so by law.